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Mullis, Tony R. Peacekeeping on the Plains: Army Operations in Bleeding
Kansas. University of Missouri Press, $44.95 ISBN 826215351
Policing the peace
Armed diplomacy delayed bloodshed
When asked to write a review of this military history of Bleeding Kansas, I
initially hesitated. I had heard of Tony Mullis's book and knew that I should read
it, but did this social and cultural historian want to slog through a military
history? Prior to this review I had never read an entire military history nor had I
ever wanted to. But, like a good soldier/historian, I put aside my biases and
decided to serve my profession with honor. Mullis has served his country (as an
officer in the Air Force and professor at the Air Command and Staff College)
and the field of Civil War studies admirably by writing this book and thus filling
an important historiographical hole. Although numerous political and social
historians have written about Bleeding Kansas, no one has endeavored to analyze
how the army operated amidst this infamous imbroglio until now.
Mullis convincingly argues that without the army's important peacekeeping
role in Bleeding Kansas, the Civil War's first shots might have rung out in
Lawrence or Topeka instead of Fort Sumter. He charts the army's course
between the opposing political factions in Kansas and demonstrates how,
particularly during the summer of 1856, the deployment of federal troops
pacified potentially explosive local militias. He also illustrates how effective
communication (command, control, communications and intelligence, or C3I)
between federal authorities in Washington, D.C., the officers at Fort
Leavenworth, and the territorial Governors proved to be vitally important to
successful peacekeeping. Slow and ineffective communication, however, often
resulted in botched missions or near-war, whether in Bleeding Kansas or on the
Great Plains.
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Discussion of the Sioux expedition in 1855 is more related to Mullis's
second objective than to his central focus on peacekeeping in Bleeding Kansas.
In addition to adding a military perspective to the political histories of the region
and the era, Mullis also claims that the army's actions in Kansas and the
trans-Missouri West provides evidence that the United States has been engaged
in peacekeeping endeavors since the mid-19th century. The obvious relevance to
our current situation in Iraq is not lost on Mullis or on this reader, and the author
reveals the often complicated and difficult situations in which soldiers found
themselves while in the process of protecting civilians.
As Mullis asserts on page 17, the army's primary purpose in the
trans-Missouri West was to protect the vital lines of communication that
emanated from Independence and St. Joseph, Missouri, as well as to shield the
American citizens who traversed them. The successful transit of mail, the
ever-expanding government projects like road and bridge-building, and the safe
passage of settlers and emigrants to the West all depended upon the army for
protection.
But Mullis points out that a standing army, even one that was asked to wear
so many peace-oriented hats, raised public suspicion and had to be deployed
carefully and tactfully. Americans have always been quick to cry tyranny, and an
overzealous army stood the risk of hearing that cry. Mullis describes the army's
attempts to quell the Lakota and Brule Sioux near Fort Laramie and uncovers the
potential dangers of ineffective C3I and inexperienced officers in the West. After
a cow wandered from a Mormon wagon train and met its maker at the hand of a
Sioux Indian, the army dispatched Lieutenant John Grattan and 20 soldiers to
arrest the offending party. But peace failed in this instance, as the overconfident
and inexperienced Grattan fired upon Chief Bear, which initiated an exchange
that resulted in the deaths of over 20 soldiers and 80 Indians. Luckily for the
army, the victims of their botched peacekeeping mission were soldiers and Sioux
Indians, not average American citizens, and thus a brief foray into war-making
and the resulting casualties did not elicit much public scrutiny. Ultimately, what
Mullis's analysis of the Sioux expedition reveals is the negative consequences of
ineffective C3I and the problems that conflicting approaches of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the War Department created for peacekeeping operations in
the West.
The relevance of the Sioux expedition to the army's policies in Bleeding
Kansas is somewhat difficult to discern, but perhaps Mullis wanted to provide
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2

Oertel: Peacekeeping on the Plains: Army Operations in Bleeding Kansas

context and contrast with the ultimately successful peacekeeping efforts in
Kansas. After all, he claims on page 236 that Peace enforcement, as exemplified
by the Sioux expedition, looked a lot like war, but Kansas never erupted into full
scale war and Mullis would argue that we have the army to thank for that feat.
First Mullis finds that inadequate and partisan civilian leadership and
ineffective C3I can be blamed, in part, for the lack of peace in Bleeding Kansas
during 1855 and early 1856. Inept territorial Governors like Wilson Shannon,
painfully slow and at times contradictory communications between Fort
Leavenworth and Washington, and an almost inexplicable reluctance to use the
telegraph help explain why Kansas bled in the fall of 1855 and spring of 1856.
For example, even after both Secretary of War Jefferson Davis and President
Pierce endorsed Colonel Edwin Sumner's suggestion to anticipate insurrectionary
activity and stave off armed conflict by using federal troops, Governor Shannon
hesitated to call on Sumner and his men. When such conflict appeared imminent
in April and May of 1856, Shannon instead employed partisan militias to enforce
territorial authority (hence, the infamous Sack of Lawrence). Mullis also
uncovers the difficulties Pierce, Davis, Sumner and Shannon had communicating
their objectives and orders and asserts that had Pierce utilized the telegraph more
readily, peace would have been easier to attain in Kansas Territory. This
discussion, like some of his detailed analysis of the C3I problems, can get mired
down in the details of who sent what to whom, why, when and how. But Mullis's
point is well taken: better communication and a unified approach to the
peacekeeping process could have eliminated even more of the blood in Kansas.
For Mullis, the final tourniquet arrived in the form of three Pennsylvanians:
territorial Governor John W. Geary, Brevet Major General Persifor F. Smith, and
future President James Buchanan. All three men were Democrats, and Geary and
Smith joined with outgoing President Pierce in his desire to make Buchanan his
successor. Democrats knew that violence in Kansas garnered votes for
Republicans, and Geary and Smith committed themselves to keeping the peace at
all costs. The key to these men's success, according to Mullis, was their
willingness to use federal troops, including a newly federalized local militia, as a
preventative tool in a non-partisan manner. Pierce and Davis supported Geary
and Smith as they enacted this strategy, and peace in Kansas prevailed in the
face of formidable odds. The Geary-Smith combo held even the fiery James
Lane and his army at bay and began to restore confidence in the ballot box over
the bowie knife.
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Mullis's study ends with Geary's administration and with the temporary
peace that his policies helped ensure, and one wonders what role the army played
in restoring or losing faith in the ballot box in 1857 and 1858 as the blood ebbed
and flowed in Kansas. But his epilogue suggests that the army could have
learned from its successes in Kansas. He points to Reconstruction and hints at
current peacekeeping ventures as areas where a better understanding of the
army's historical approach to brokering peace while living amidst hostile
civilians could have facilitated the pursuit of a more permanent calm. Mullis's
book is important for all historians who study Bleeding Kansas and enlightening
for all Americans who only associate the army with war.
Kristen Tegtmeier Oertel is assistant professor of history at Millsaps
College in Jackson, Mississippi. She is the author of Bleeding Borders: The
Intersection of Gender, Race and Region in Pre-Civil War Kansas and is
currently working on a biography of Clarina I.H. Nichols.
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